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Many economists question the need for social intervention in training, arguing
that the benefits accruing to employers and employees create sufficient incentive
for private financing. Research findings indicate that in practice this means
depending on employers because it is they who pay for the bulk of employee
training, even when the skills being taught are useful at other firms. Yet in
practice, private incentives for on-the-job learning and training do not current-
ly generate broader results that are in the public interest. This chapter looks at
the theoretical and empirical evidence of market failure in training provisions. It
argues that the training market in the United States is failing to provide a
socially optimal quantity and quality of employer training. Specifically, it
examines four potential sources of market failure: real externalities, tax-induced
distortions, liquidity constraints, and government regulatory interventions that
discourage training. Each of them are found to operate to some degree in some
training markets.
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Public control and subsidy of schooling and public involvement in other
forms of education and training is justified because the individual who
gets the education and training receives only part of its benefits. There
are social benefits as well. When deciding on the type and amount of
education and training to undertake and how hard to study while at
school, most individuals are taking only private benefits-the higher
after-tax income and the prestige and consumption benefits of having an
education-into account. These private benefits account for only part of
the total benefits to society of education and training, however. People
who have received more or better education and training or who
a:hieved more during the experience benefit others in society by paying
hIgher taxes, by making discoveries or artistic contributions that benefit
others in the society, by being more likely to give time and money to
charity, by being less likely to experience long periods of hospitalization
that are paid for by insurance or government, and in many other ways
(Haveman & Wolfe, 1984). Economists call social benefits such as these
spillovers or externalities. Private decisions will lead to an insufficient
quantity and quality of education and training and insufficient achieve-
~ent by students, unless public agencies intervene and partially subsi-
dIze .the .cost or add to the rewards. The appropriate amount of public
SUbSI~y IS closely related to the size of the spillover or the externality
benefIts of education and training. Two kinds of real externalities pro-
duced by training are discussed next.
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High-quality training benefits customers and the public as well as the
trainer and the trainee. When, for example, the dancers of the New York
City Bal~et receive excellent training, the company benefits through
greater tIcket revenue, but the audience benefits as well because they
derive a larger consumer surplus from the performance. The COMSA T
employee who figured out how to double the lifetime of communication
satellites by judicious use of the rocket fuel remaining on board benefit-
ed customers and competitors at least as much as he benefited COM-
SAT. The A~oha airlines pilot who landed the plane after an explosive
d~compres~lO~ and th~ loss of a major section of the plane certainly
raIsed the lIfetime earmngs of the passengers. On-the-job training (OJT)
and experience were critical to the COMSA T discovery and the safe
landing of the Aloha plane.
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ERNALITIES customers and the general public often lose as much as the worker and
the. c~mpany. E~amples of disasters caused or contributed to by poor
traInIng are legIOn: Chernoble, Three Mile Island, Exxon Valdez, the
shoot-down of the Korean Airlines 747 flight (pilot error caused the
plane to be off course), and Greyhound bus crashes in New York State.
Tort law internalizes some but not all of these costs. A study of egre-
gious physician errors in New York State found that only one-eighth of
the~ resulted in a malpractice claim. Damage awards are typically paid
by Insurance funds that are imperfectly experience rated. Where the
public interest in insuring top quality training is manifest to all, training
is often regulated or subsidized by government. The Federal Aviation
Administration, the Department of Transportation, and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, for example, engage in such regulation.
.
However, for every big discovery or disaster that gets media
attention and generates a political response, there are millions of little
discoveries, unrewarded services, or unanticipated product failures that
directly effect consumers that do not generate political responses.
Because customers lack low-cost access to accurate information on the
~uali.ty of w~at they are b~ying, the prices paid do not fully reflect qual-
Ity dIfferentials between dIfferent providers. As a consequence, training
that enhances quality and reliability often generates benefits to cus-
tomers that are not recognized or rewarded by the market.
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Poor Signaling of General Skills to Other Employers
ble to Training
The training provided by one employer benefits other employers and
consumers, not just the trainee and his or her employer (Bishop, 1991).
The worker is more productive in future jobs, but these employers do
not perceive accurately the quality of the general OJT received by the
worker and, as a result, do not fully compensate the trained worker for
t~~ir higher productivity. Bishop's (1994) study of the relative produc-
tiVIty and profitability of new hires obtained results that are consistent
wi~h .this hypothesis. New hires who had received formal off-the-job
traInIn~ sponso.red by a. previous employer made significantly more
suggesh~ns desIgned to Improve productivity, were more productive,
~nd profitable and were less likely to be fired. If one accepts these find-
Ings as val~d, the impli~ation is a market failure that reduces the payoff
,
to worker Investments In OJT. The ultimate cause of this problem is the
lack of effective signals of the quantity and quality of training.
Institutions for signaling occupational competence-a comparison. In
the u.~. labor market, hiring decision makers have a very difficult time
assessIng the quality of the general human capital obtained from OJT.
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Such assessment difficulties increase turnover, lower wages, and lower
productivity. Because part of the reason for getting general training is to
improve the worker's marketability with other employers, not recogniz-
ing the benefits of training reduces the incentive to invest in general
OJT.l Doing an especially good job of training employees will benefit the
trained workers when they leave the firm, only if the firm develops a
reputation for being a good trainer.2 Past experience with the former
employees of a firm is probably the primary determinant of a firm's rep-
utation as a trainer. Large firms that turn over a reasonable share of their
trainees are likely to develop a reputation (good or bad) for the training
that they provide. It is well known, for instance, that IBM and General
lLack of information about the quality of general OJT received can increase
investment in general OJT only under the very unlikely circumstances of very
high retention rates and large differentials between the rates at which employers
and employees trade off present before-tax income for future before-tax income.
Under these circumstances the employer's desire to invest in general training
may be stronger than the worker's desire. Because the wage will have to be
increased by an equivalent amount, employers cannot benefit from (and there-
fore do not pay for) general training that is visible to other employers.
Consequently, as such training becomes more visible to other calculus that
determines the amount of training shifts to give greater weight to the very high
discount rates faced by the worker, possibly reducing investment in general
training. The condition that would have to be satisfied is that the retention rate
would have to be equal to or greater than the ratio of the firm and worker dis-
count factors. Even if the worker were to face yearly interest rates that were dou-
ble the firm's rate (e.g., 30% rather than 15%), the yearly retention rate would
have to be above 85%. Retention rates for the first year at a job are seldom above
50% and average yearly retention rates for all employees new and old seldom
exceed 85%. Yearly retention rates of employees who have been at the firm for
many years may exceed 85%, but these more mature workers will typically have
better access to capital markets than younger workers and face a tax regime that
is neutral to OJT. This discussion has been based on the theoretical analysis of
the training decision presented in Bishop and Kang (1984, 1988).
2Well-trained employees who leave the firm that provided the training may ben-
efit if their new employer eventually learns of their greater-than anticipated pro-
ductivity and makes later adju~tments to their wage or bases a promotion on it.
In the model presented in Bishop and Kang (1984, 1988), high renegotiation
costs prevent such adjustments from occurring at the first employer. If a third
period was added to the model and retention in the second job modeled, the
same assumption of high renegotiation costs would prevent the worker from
benefiting from better-than-expected training in the second job. If one were to
relax the assumption that post-training wage rates are prespecified and analyze
a multiperiod model, the size of the distortion to training investment decisions
would be reduced, but it would not disappear. Productivity is measured with
error so one could never expect the new employer to perceive the full value of
the worker's greater-than-anticipated training. Furthermore, other employers
remain ignorant of greater-than-anticipated productivity. For all intents and
purposes this greater productivity is specific to the firm, so the worker will only
receive a small sh"re uf this greater productivity in higher wage rates.
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Electric provide excellent training to their newly recruited junior execu-
tives. The positive reputation helps the separating employees find better
jobs, and, in turn, helps the firm recruit the best possible candidates
when it is hiring. Even though a good reputation as a trainer forces them
to pay higher wages in the posttraining period, most firms have a strong
interest in establishing such a reputation. The armed forces are aware of
the positive training reputation and consequently spend millions of dol-
lars advertising the quality and civilian usefulness of their training.
Most young workers without a baccalaureate degree, however,
do not obtain jobs at the large firms with established training reputa-
tions. The smaller lesser known firms in which they find their first job
typically have unknown reputations when it comes to the quality and
general usefulness of their training.
The lack of full reward for improvements in general skills if one
leaves the current employer affects the incentives for the trainer and
trainee to devote time and energy to learning general skills. The higher
the worker's likelihood of leaving the firm, the lower is that worker's
incentive to devote him- or herself to learning general (or specific) skills
that are not immediately visible to other employers. As a result, the
underinvestment in general OJT is greatest for temporary and seasonal
employees and for young people as a group.
The poor quality of the information about a job candidate's gen-
eral skills and the resulting underinvestment in general training (both
on the job and in schools) is a major institutional flaw in U.S. labor mar-
kets. Formal systems for certifying the competencies gained through OJT
exist in the United States, but they have not achieved the widespread
usage they deserve. The apprenticeship systems of Switzerland, Austria,
and Germany are probably the best examples in the world of wide-
spread and effective systems of OJT and competency certification. One
of the most important features of these apprenticeship systems is the
requirement that the apprentice pass written and practical examinations
covering the occupation's curriculum. If an employer cannot provide
training in all the skills included in the curriculum, it must arrange for
its apprentices to receive instruction at another firm or at a special
employer-run school. The examinations are set and scored by a local
committee of masters (skilled workers) and employers, so the quality of
the training provided by the master and the firm is put to a public test.
Passing the apprenticeship exam is of benefit not only to the trainee, but
it is important to the masters as well. Their reputations among their
peers and their abilities to recruit high-quality apprentices depend on it.
As a result, 90% of German apprentices remain at one employer for the
full 3-year apprenticeship period, and 90% of these apprentices pass the
test (on the first or second try). The apprenticeship systems of the
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English-speaking nations are based on time served rather than on compe-
tencies achieved and are considerably less successful in standardizing and
upgrading the training that occurs.
The examination at the end of the training process is the key to
maintaining quality control. In the late 19th century, the Swiss educa-
tional/training system went through a period of crisis and self-examina-
tion not unlike what is now happening in the United States and the
United Kingdom. The nation had to export to survive, but the quality of
workmanship was low and deteriorating. The Swiss assigned blame to
their apprenticeship system and proceeded to reform it by ending
apprenticeship based on time served, establishing a standardized cur-
riculum, and instituting written and practical examinations set by local
committees of employers and workers. The high standards of workman-
ship for which Swiss workers are renowned are not an inherent trait of
national character, but rather are the consequence of the institutions that
teach, test, certify, and publicize the workmanship.
The standardized curricula and the proficiency exam at the end
of the apprenticeship mean that the quality and nature of the training is
well signaled to employers in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. The
result is that the worker can count on benefiting from doing a good job
in his or her apprenticeship, even if the training employer does not
retain them. Because the future payoff is certain, German apprentices are
willing to start out at a wage that is only about one-quarter of the wage
they will be able to command at the end of the apprenticeship. If the
apprentices were adults, they could not afford to accept so Iowa wage.
They are, however, teenagers living at home who are heavily subsidized
by their parents. Consequently, the liquidity constraint that is such a
barrier to heavy investments in general training in the United States is
much less of a problem in Germany.
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The Nondeductibility of Some Training Expenses
The benefits of training are taxed, but not all of the costs are deductible.3
Some of the time that trainees devote to employer-sponsored training
comes from reducing leisure time. Employees taking job-related college
3If training an employee causes a reduction in output or necessitates an increase
in hours paid, profits, and thus taxes, are reduced. If workers pay for training by
accepting lower wage jobs, individual income tax payments are reduced. In both
of these cases, training costs are effectively deductible in the year they are
incurred. If all individuals pay taxes every year at the same marginal tax rate,
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courses typically attend classes and do their homework on their own
time. Japanese workers frequently take con-espondence courses related to
their job and, when they are rotated to a new job, the meticulous descrip-
tion of how the job is done, written by its previous occupant, is studied at
home. Japanese supervisors are expected to fill slack time with training.
When Ronald Dore presented his passport at an out-of-the-way port of
entry that seldom sees British passports, the supervisor called his
younger colleagues over and taught them about its intricacies while Dore
looked on (Dore & Sako, 1989). Such a training session delayed passen-
gers somewhat and necessitated a sacrifice of on-the-job leisure, but out-
put-the number of passengers processed--did not change. Incentives to
undertake training are distorted if government does not share in the costs
of training to the same degree it shares in its rewards.
The Progressive Income Tax
iI
i
I
t
I
J
f
I
I
1i
t
I
Ij
r
The second tax-induced distortion arises from the fact that investmen~s
in OJT are typically made at a time when the individual has no tax liabil-
ity or a lower-than-normal marginal tax rate, and the benefits are
received when earnings and marginal tax rates are higher. As a result,
the after-tax benefits of an OJT investment are reduced more than the
after-tax costs, and such investments are discouraged. Firms, on the
other hand, train continuously, so the marginal tax rates faced when the
costs of training are incurred and deducted are no different from those
faced during the payoff period.
HIGH BORROWING COSTS AND LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS
The third reason why society subsidizes schooling is the failure of the
free market (in the absence of publicly funded loan guarantee programs)
to offer loans to young persons seeking to invest in their education. The
government recognized long ago that people going to school needed
access to low-interest, government-guaranteed loans. Workers investing
in general OJT have a similar need but are not eligible for such loans
unless they happen to be part of a training program run by an accredited
educational institution. Because of the fear of turnover, employers are
reluctant to pay for general training that is visible and useful in other
the tax system would not distort decisions to invest in OJT. In fact, however,
some training costs are not deductible and tax rates are generally higher when
benefits are being received than when costs are being incurred, so the tax system
discourages training investments.
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firms. If the employer is not willing to pay for general training, it will be
offered only to those workers who pay for it by accepting a lower wage
during the training period than could be obtained elsewhere. The more
intensive the training, the greater the required reduction in wages will
have to be. Many workers are unwilling to accept a large reduction in
their current standard of living, and because they are unable to borrow
at reasonable interest rates, they forego the investments in general OJT.4
If they fund such investments, they do so only if extremely high rates of
return can be obtained.
Most young workers are liquidity constrained, that is, they are
unable to shift as much consumption from the future into the present as
they would like because they have neither assets that can be depleted nor
access to credit at reasonable terms. Half of the households headed by
someone under 25 years old have less than $746 in financial assets, and
19% have no financial assets at all. Half of the households headed by
someone between 25 and 34 years old have less than $1514 in financial
assets, and 13% have none (Survey of Consumer Finances, 1984).
Subsidized or guaranteed student loans are not available to finance OJT,
and banks will not lend money for training purposes without collateral.
Borrowing against the equity in one's home is a possibility for some, but
only 34% of the households with heads under 35 years old own a home,
and many of the houses have been owned for only a short while, so that
the equity that can be borrowed against is small. Even with collateral, the
loans available to individuals usually carry higher interest rates than
those charged businesses. Studies of the willingness of consumers to sub-
stitute consumption over time have all concluded that the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is no higher than 1, and most studies conclude it
is .5 or below (Friend & Blume, 1975; Hall, 1988; Hubbard & Judd, 1986).
A substitution elasticity of .5 implies that reducing a liquidity that con-
strained a worker's wages by one-half (in order to pay for general train-
ing) roughly quadruples the worker's marginal utility of consumption.
Such a worker would be willing to give up $4.00 of future income in
return for $1.00 of current income. The liquidity constraint phenomenon
has little effect on the wage profile of jobs requiring no general training
and which, therefore, have a flat pr.
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in an employment contract in which
eral training (Feuer, Glick, & Desai, 1
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ings for present earnings. The comf
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and which, therefore, have a flat productivity profile. Where significant
general training is occurring, however, it comes into play and may result
in an employment contract in which the employer shares the costs of gen-
eral training (Feuer, Glick, & Desai, 1987; Glick & Feuer, 1984).
Firms are thus more willing than workers to trade future earn-
ings for present earnings. The compensation packages that result from
the asymmetric access to capital markets and the progressive tax struc-
ture reflect the worker's strong preference for compensation now rather
than later. In effect, firms offer new hires a loan that will be canceled if a
separation occurs. Firms do not require repayment of the loan when sep-
arations occur for the same reasons that banks do not offer large unse-
cured loans without a government guarantee of payment. The adminis-
trative costs of obtaining repayment are extremely high, and bankruptcy
is a real option for someone with zero assets. Firms, however, undertake
to finance some of the costs of general OJT only when their investment
yields a return sufficient to pay for the cost of capital and the risk of
turnover. Such justifications reduce employer investments in general
OJT below the level that would have prevailed if workers were able to
borrow at the same interest rates as employers.
REPAIRING GOVERNMENT-CREATED DISTORTIONS
A fourth justification of public efforts to encourage greater OJT is to
undo the damage done by other government interventions in the labor
market that discourage it. With respect to investments in OJT, the two
most significant of such interventions are the minimum wage and barri-
ers to employer use of basic skills tests and high school grades as
devices for selecting new workers.
Minimum Wage
The minimum wage prevents unskilled American workers from offering
to pay for general training by accepting a subminimum wage during the
training period. Providing training to a new employee is costly. The new
employee is not very productive at first, and other workers must take
time away from their regular activities to give instruction to the new
hire. Many of the skills that the new employee learns have application in
other firms as well. To avoid losing the worker to another firm, the
employer providing the training must raise the wage as the trainee's
productivity increases. Jobs that offer training and the prospect of future
wage increases are more attractive than those that do not. The competi-
,""7;.
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tion for these jobs will enable employers offering general training to
obtain workers at lower wage rates.
Minimum wage legislation, however, prevents wage rates from
falling below the legislated monetary figure. Lacking the ability to get
new employees to pay a major share of the costs of general training (by
accepting a low wage during the training period), employers will adopt
production technologies that minimize the skill requirements of the job.'
The evolution of the diner and the small, family-operated restaurant into
franchised fast-food operations using specially designed machines and
prepackaged food is an example of how this is accomplished. By reduc-
ing the skills required to do the job, the employer shortens the time it
takes for new employees to reach maximum productivity. The same
people may have the job, but they are taught less, and what is taught is
useful only in that firm, not elsewhere. Opportunities for promotion are
minimal, and wage increases are small or nonexistent.
A second impact of the minimum wage is that the forced
increase in the starting wage is partially compensated by a fall in wage
rates during the posttraining period. The fall in wages increases the quit
rate, which in turn reduces the payoffs that employers receive from for-
mal training and, therefore, their willingness to make such investments
or to hire individuals who require substantial training investments. The
predictions of theory have been confirmed by at least two studies
(Hashimoto, 1982; Leighton & Mincer, 1981).
Barriers to Careful Selection of Entry Level Workers
In the United States, governmental institutions and regulations are an
important reason why American employers do a poor job of selecting
entry-level workers and experience very high rates of turnover.
Employers are not able to obtain good information on the skills and
competencies of young job applicants. Employers believe that school
performance is a good predictor of job performanceS, but they have great
difficulty getting such information. If a student or graduate has given
written permission for a transcript to be sent to an employer, the Federal
Education Rights and Privacy Act obligates the school to respond. Many
high schools are not, however, responding to such requests. In
Columbus, OH, for example, Nationwide Insurance sent over 1,200
requests for transcripts signed by job applicants to high schools in 1982
and received only 93 responses.
An additional barrier to the use of high school transcripts in
SPolicy capturing experiments have found that employers give substantially
higher ratings to job applicants with high grade point averages (Hollenbeck &
Smith, 1984),
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selecting new employees is that when high schools do respond, it takes a
great deal of time. In most high schools, the system for responding to
transcript requests has been designed to meet the needs of college-
bound students rather than the students who seek jobs immediately
after graduation. A 1987 survey of a stratified random sample of small-
and medium-sized employers who were members of the National
Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) found that transcripts had
been obtained prior to the selection decision for only 14.2% of the high
school graduates hired.6 Only 15% had asked high school graduates to
report their grade-point average. The absence of questions about grades
from most job applications reflects the low reliability of self-reported
data, the difficulties of verifying it, and the fear of Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) challenges to such questions.
Hiring on the basis of recommendations by high school teachers
is also uncommon. In the NFIB survey, when a high school graduate
was hired, the new hire had been referred or recommended by vocation-
al teachers in only 5.2% of the cases and referred by someone else in the
high school in only 2.7% of the cases.
Tests are available for measuring competency in reading, writ-
ing, mathematics, science, and by EEOC guidelines, which made it pro-
hibitively costly to demonstrate the validity of tests assessing compe-
tence in English and mathematics.7 Before such a test could be used, the
firm had to conduct a very expensive validity study of the proposed test
and alternative tests at their own work sites. Separate studies had to be
done for men and women, blacks, Hispanics, and whites. Most firms did
not have enough workers in each category to do a reliable study
(Friedman & Williams, 1982). Litigation costs and the potential liability
are substantial. Using an event study methodology, Hersch (1991) found
that corporations that were the target of a class-action discrimination
suit which was important enough to appear in' the Wall Street Journal
experienced a 15% decline in their market value during the 61-day peri-
6!he survey was of a stratified random sample of the NFIB membership. Larger
firms had a significantly higher probability of being selected for the study. The
response rate to the mail survey was 20%, and the number of usable responses
was 2,014.
:"TheSupreme Court's decision in the Wards Cove Packing Case has made it eas-
~erfor employers to defend the use of selection methods that produce adverse
Impact and has therefore opened the door for increased use of employment tests.
It .appears that employers will be able to justify the use of employment tests
WIt~~uthaving to undertake costly validity studies in their own firm by citing
val~dIt~research done for similar jobs in other firms. Congress is considering
legIslation that would reverse Wards Cove and make it even harder to defend
the use of selection procedures that have adverse impact than under the Griggs
~recedent. If this legislation passes, the ability of firms to make wise hiring deci-
SIonswill deteriorate even more.
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od surrounding the announcement of the suit. Companies became
extremely cautious about testing, and the result was to greatly diminish
the use of tests for employee selection. A 1987 survey of the membership
of the National Federation of Independent Business found that basic
skills tests had been given in only 2.9% of the hiring decisions studied.
Other countries handle the signaling of high school accomplish-
ments to prospective employers much more effectively and have much
lower turnover rates as a result.
CONCLUSION
Turnover affects the stock of trained workers in three ways. First, high
turnover necessarily implies that a given rate of investment in firm spe-
cific skills yields a smaller stock of workers with such skills. Many of
those trained have moved on to other firms at which the firm specific
components of training wield no benefits.
Second, turnover has a powerful effect on employer decisions to
provide training to employees. Employers, not workers, finance most of the
training that is undertaken in U.S. firms (see above). Employers will not
invest in training unless they believe it will generate a monthly return that
exceeds the sum of the monthly turnover rate (generally above 2% per
month in the United States and sometimes greater than 8% per month) and
the cost of capital (which is about 1.5% per month or 18% per year).
Monthly turnover rates are typically much larger than the cost of capital
and are also much more variable. If turnover is 5% per month and the cost
of capital is 1.5% per month, the cash flow yield of the training investment
rate of return must exceed 78% per year if the investment is to make eco-
nomic sense. Even when turnover is very low-2% per month-required
cash flow yield is still quite high-42% per year. Training thus becomes a
sensible investment for an American employer only when it yields very
rapid and very large returns. The amount of training employers are willing
to finance is negatively related to the projected turnover rate of the trainees.
The third reason why turnover is so critical is its impact on the
process of teaching and learning. Turnover disrupts learning regardless
of whether the skills being learned are generic or firm specific. Schools
teach general skills and follow a common curriculum, yet have great dif-
ficulty when students transfer from one school to another during the
school year. Teaching must be adjusted to the special needs of the learn-
er, and it takes time for the teacher to learn of those special needs.
Learning occurs best when instructor and learner have a close personal
relationship, and it takes time to build such relationships.
The high rates of turnover in America, then, help explain why
investments in OJT are lower in this country than in Japan and Germany.
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